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Abstract—Social networks have become ubiquitous in our daily
life, as such it has attracted great research interests recently. A
key challenge is that it is of extremely large-scale with tremendous
information flow, creating the phenomenon of “Big Data”. Under
such a circumstance, understanding information diffusion over
social networks has become an important research issue. Most
of the existing works on information diffusion analysis are based
on either network structure modeling or empirical approach
with dataset mining. However, the information diffusion is also
heavily influenced by network users’ decisions, actions and their
socio-economic connections, which is generally ignored in existing
works. In this paper, we propose an evolutionary game theoretic
framework to model the dynamic information diffusion process
in social networks. Specifically, we analyze the framework in
uniform degree and non-uniform degree networks and derive the
closed-form expressions of the evolutionary stable network states.
Moreover, the information diffusion over two special networks,
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random network and the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free
network, are also highlighted. To verify our theoretical analysis,
we conduct experiments by using both synthetic networks and
real-world Facebook network, as well as real-world information
spreading dataset of Twitter and Memetracker. Experiments
shows that the proposed game theoretic framework is effective
and practical in modeling the social network users’ information
forwarding behaviors.
Index Terms—Social networks, information diffusion, informa-
tion spreading, game theory, evolutionary game,
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, with the rapid development of the
Internet and mobile technologies, social networks have become
ubiquitous. Due to its diverse implication, researchers of
different disciplines have been working on social networking
from various perspectives [1]. A social network is a network
made of connections and interactions among social entities,
which can be individuals, websites, organizations and even
intelligent equipments. Typical social network examples in-
clude Facebook/Twitter networks, hyperlink networks of web-
sites, scientific collaboration/citation networks, and Internet of
Things (IoT) [2].
Today’s social networks are of very large-scale and becom-
ing tremendous-scale, e.g., Facebook has nearly one billion
active users as of September 2012 [3]. Over such large-scale
social networks, users are exchanging their information, status
and ideas in the form of “word-of-mouth” communications
everyday. Under such a circumstance, how the information
diffuses over the underlying social network has become an
important research problem. On one hand, the study of
information diffusion can help the enterprises/polititians to
identify the influential users and links, on which the initial
advertisement/advocation will be most effective. On the other
hand, from the security point of view, the study of information
diffusion can also help to prevent the detrimental information
spreading, e.g. computer virus. The recent developments of
information and communication technologies enable us to
collect, store, and access the real-world big data, making the
information diffusion research versatile and meaningful, at the
same time more challenging. For instance, Fig. 1 shows the
normalized number of forwarding of different Twitter hashtags
using dataset [4], which contains 1000 highest total volume
hashtags among 6 million hashtags from Jun to Dec 2009 [5].
From Fig. 1, we can see that different phrases reached different
levels of popularity at different time. How to model such
information diffusion process and predict the final stable state
of the information diffusion? In this paper, we will attempt
to answer these questions using graphical evolutionary game
theory.
The study of information diffusion originates from the
research of computer virus/epidemic spreading over network
[6]. One of the earliest and prominent works about information
diffusion is [7], which studied the dynamics of information
propagation through blogspace from both macroscopic and
microscopic points of views. Subsequently, there are numerous
works on the information diffusion, and here we summarize
the works that are most representative and relevant to our
study. The existing works about information diffusion can
be classified into two categories. The first category focuses
on analyzing the characteristics of information diffusion [8]-
[12]. In [8], the authors discussed how to extract the most
influential nodes on a large-scale social network. Later, a
community-based greedy algorithm was proposed for mining
top-k influential nodes in mobile social networks [9]. How
to restrain the private or contaminated information diffusion
was studied in [10] and [11] through identifying the important
information links and hubs, respectively. On the other hand,
how to maximize information diffusion through a network was
discussed in [12] by designing effective neighbours selection
strategies.
The second category focuses on analyzing the dynamic
diffusion process over different kinds of networks using dif-
ferent mathematical models [13]-[18]. In [13], the authors
studied how social networks affect the spread of behavior and
investigated the effects of network structure on users’ behavior
diffusion. Rather than focusing on the behavior diffusion,
Bakshy et al. studied the role of social networks in general
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Fig. 1. Normalized number of forwarding of different Twitter hashtags using dataset [4], collected from Sep. 2008 to Aug. 2009.
information diffusion through an experimental approach [14].
Recently, as social networks, e.g., Facebook and Twitter,
become more and more popular, some empirical analysis were
conducted using large-scale datasets, including predicting the
speed and range of information diffusion on Twitter [15],
modeling the global influence of a node on the rate of dif-
fusion on Twitter [16], illustrating the statistical mechanics of
rumor spreading on Facebook [17]. Moreover, the information
diffusion on overlaying social-physical networks was analyzed
in [18]. The information diffusion analysis presented in this
paper falls into the second category, i.e., our focus is on the
analysis of dynamic diffusion process.
Most of existing works on diffusion analysis mainly rely
on the social network structure and/or the collected data,
while totally ignore the actions and decision making of users.
However, the influence of users’ decisions, actions and socio-
economic connections on information forwarding also plays an
important role in the diffusion process. What does that actually
mean? In essence, for information to diffuse, it relies on other
users to forward the information they receive. However, it is
not unconditional. One has to make a decision on whether or
not to do so based on many factors, such as if the information
is exciting or if his/her friends are interested on it, etc. This
kind of interaction can often be modeled by using game theory
[19]. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a game theoretic
framework to analyze the information diffusion over social
network. Specifically, we find that in essence the information
diffusion process on social networks follows similarly the
evolution process in natural ecological systems [20]. It is a
process that evolves from one state at a particular instance
to another when information is being forwarded and diffused
around. Thus, we consider the graphical evolutionary game
to model and analyze the social network users’ information
forwarding strategies and the dynamic diffusion process.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows.
1) We propose a graphical evolutionary game theoretic
framework to model and understand information diffu-
sion over social networks. The framework reveals the
dynamics of information diffusion among users through
analyzing their learning, interactions and decision mak-
ing. Moreover, the framework not only can illustrate the
dynamic process of the information diffusion, but also
predict the final diffusion state.
2) Based on the graphical evolutionary game theoretic
formulation, we analyze the dynamic diffusion process
over uniform degree and non-uniform degree networks.
The closed-form expressions for the evolutionary stable
network states are obtained. Moreover, the information
diffusion over two special networks, Erdo˝s-Re´nyi ran-
dom network and the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free net-
work, are also studied.
3) We conduct experiments to validate our information dif-
fusion analysis using both synthetic networks including
uniform-degree network, Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random network
and the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network, and real-
world Facebook network. Moreover, we also use the
real-world information spreading dataset from Meme-
tracker and Twitter [21] to further verify the diffusion
analysis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first give
a brief overview of graphical evolutionary game formulation
of information diffusion in Section II. Then, we analyze the
dynamic information diffusion process over uniform and non-
uniform degree networks in Section III and IV, respectively.
Experiments results are shown in Section V and conclusions
are drawn in Section VI.
II. GRAPHICAL EVOLUTIONARY GAME FORMULATION
In this section, we discuss the formulation of the informa-
tion diffusion problem using graphical evolutionary game. We
first introduce the basic concepts of graphical evolutionary
game, and then elaborate how to formulate the information
diffusion process using graphical evolutionary game theory.
A. Basic Concepts of Graphical Evolutionary Game
The traditional interpretation of game theory is that a game
with some specific rule is played among a group of static
players and a static Nash equilibrium (NE) can be achieved
by analyzing the players’ payoff, utility function and the
game rule. Evolutionary game theory (EGT) originated from
ecological biology [20], instead, imagines that a game is
played over and over again by biologically or socially condi-
tioned players who are randomly drawn from large populations
[22]. It studies the population shift and evolving process due
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Fig. 2. Three different update rules, where death selections are shown in dark blue and birth selections are shown in red.
to the influence of mutants. Meanwhile, EGT emphasizes
more on the dynamics and stability of the whole population’s
strategies, instead of only focusing on the property of the static
NE. Recently, EGT has been widely used to model users’
behaviors in communication and networking area [23][24],
including congestion control [25], cooperative sensing [26],
cooperative peer-to-peer (P2P) streaming [27] and dynamic
spectrum access [28], and also image processing area [29]. In
these literatures, evolutionary game has been shown to be an
effective approach to model the dynamic social interactions
among users in a network.
EGT studies how a group of players converges to a stable
equilibrium after a period of strategic interactions. Such a
final equilibrium state is defined as the Evolutionarily Stable
State (ESS). Let us consider an evolutionary game with m
strategies X = {1, 2, ...,m} and payoff matrix, U, which is
an m × m matrix, whose entry, uij , denotes the payoff for
strategy i versus strategy j. The system state of this game
can be defined as p = [p1, ..., pi, ..., pm]T , where pi is the
fraction of population using strategy i and
∑m
i=1 pi = 1. In
such a case, the average mean payoff within a (sub-)population
in state q = [q1, q2, ..., qm]′ against a population in state p is
q′Up. A state p∗ is an ESS, if and only if for all different
states q 6= p, p∗ satisfies follows [30]:
1) q′Up∗ ≤ p∗′Up∗, (1)
2) if q′Up∗ = p∗′Up∗, p∗′Uq > q′Uq. (2)
The first condition guarantees that the average mean payoff of
the population in a different state q against the ESS p∗ does
not exceed the average payoff of the population in p∗, which
is equivalent to the Nash equilibrium condition. The second
condition shows that, in case of equality in the equilibrium
condition, the average payoff of state q against itself is lower
than that of state p∗ against q, which further guarantees the
stability of the ESS p∗. From such a definition, we can see
that even if a small fraction of players may not be rational and
take out-of-equilibrium strategies, ESS is still a locally stable
state. How to find the ESSs is an important issue in EGT. One
common approach is to find the stable points of the system
state dynamic p˙ = dp/dt [22], i.e,
p∗ = arg
p
(p˙ = 0) . (3)
The classical evolutionary game theory considers a popula-
tion in a complete graph. However, in many scenarios, players’
spatial locations may lead to an incomplete graph structure.
Graphical evolutionary game theory is introduced to study
the strategies evolution in such a finite structured population
[31]. In graphical EGT, the “fitness” of a player is locally
determined from interactions with all adjacent players, which
is defined as [32]
pi = (1− α) ·B + α · U, (4)
where B is the baseline fitness, which represents the player’s
inherent property. For example, in a social network, a user’s
4baseline fitness can be interpreted as his/her own interests on
the released news. U is the player’s payoff which is determined
by the predefined payoff matrix and the graph structure. The
parameter α represents the selection intensity, i.e., the relative
contribution of the game to fitness. The case α→ 0 represents
the limit of weak selection [33], while α = 1 denotes strong
selection, where fitness equals payoff. The ESS of graphical
EGT is also of importance, which is usually analyzed under
different strategy updating rules, including birth-death (BD),
death-birth (DB) and imitation (IM) introduced as follows
[34].
• BD update rule: a player is chosen for reproduction
with the probability being proportional to fitness (Birth
process). Then, the chosen player’s strategy replaces
one neighbor’s strategy with uniform probability (Death
process), as shown in Fig. 2-(a).
• DB update rule: a random player is chosen to abandon
his/her current strategy (Death process). Then, the chosen
player adopts one of his/her neighbors’ strategies with
the probability being proportional to their fitness (Birth
process), as shown in Fig. 2-(b).
• IM update rule: each player either adopts the strategy
of one neighbor or remains with his/her current strategy,
with the probability being proportional to fitness, as
shown in Fig. 2-(c).
These strategy update rules are also from the evolutionary
biology filed, which are used to model the resident/mutant
evolution process. Through analyzing the system dynamics
under some specific strategy update rule, the final ESSs can
be found at the stable points of the dynamics. In summary,
graph structure, players, strategy, fitness (payoff) and ESS
are five basic elements of a graphical evolutionary game.
In the following, we will illustrate how to formulate the
dynamic information diffusion process in a social network
using graphical EGT.
B. Graphical Evolutionary Game Formulation
A social network is usually illustrated by a graph, where
each node represents a user and the edge represents the
relationship between users. The users can be either human
in a social network or websites on the internet, while the re-
lationship can be either friendship between users or hyperlink
between webpages. When some new information is originated
from one user, the information may be propagated over the
network depending on other users’ actions: to forward the
information or not. For each user, whether to forward the
information is determined by several factors, including the
user’s own interest on this information and his/her neighbor’s
actions in the sense that if all his/her neighbors forward the
information, the user may also forward the information with
relatively high probability. In such a case, the users’ actions
are coupled with each other through their social interactions.
This is very similar to the player’s strategy update in the
aforementioned graphical EGT, where players’ strategies are
also influenced with each other through the graph structure.
Compared with the strategy updating in the graphical EGT,
the information diffusion over social network shares funda-
mental similarities. A user in a social network can be regarded
TABLE I
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GRAPHICAL EGT AND SOCIAL NETWORK.
Graphical EGT Social Network
Graph structure Social network topology
Players Users in the social network
Strategy
Sf : forward the information
Sn: not forward the information
Fitness Utility from forwarding or not
ESS Stable information diffusion state
as a player in a graphical evolutionary game. And each user’s
two possible actions, i.e., to forward or not forward, are
corresponding with two strategies{
Sf , forward the information,
Sn, not forward the information.
(5)
Meanwhile, users’ payoff matrix can be written as
Sf Sn
Sf
(
uff ufn
)
Sn ufn unn
(6)
where a symmetric payoff structure is considered, i.e., when
a user with strategy Sf meets a user with strategy Sn, each
of them receives the same payoff ufn. Moreover, we assume
that the payoff has been normalized within interval (0, 1), i.e.,
0 < uff , ufn, unn < 1. The physical meaning of the payoff
can be either the popularity of a user in a social network or
the hit rate of a website. Note that under different application
scenarios, the values of the payoff matrix may be different.
For example, if the information is related to recent hot topics
and forwarding of the information can attract more attentions
from other users or website, the payoff matrix should have
the following characteristic: uff ≥ ufn ≥ unn. On the other
hand, if the information is about useless advertisements, the
payoff matrix would exhibit unn ≥ ufn ≥ uff . Furthermore,
if the information is supposed to be shared only within a
circle, i.e., a small group with same interest, the payoff matrix
could exhibit ufn ≥ uff ≥ unn. It is also worth mentioning
that the payoff matrix defined in (6) is similar to that of the
coordination game, where two users making the same actions
can obtain symmetric higher payoff than making different
actions [35].
Based on the above definitions of strategy and payoff
function, we can further define the fitness of users with strategy
Sf and strategy Sn, respectively. According to (4), for a user
with strategy Sf and k neighbors, among which kf users
adopting the same strategy Sf and k − kf users adopting
strategy Sn, his/her fitness can be written as
pif (k, kf ) = (1 − α) + α [kfuff + (k − kf )ufn] , (7)
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Fig. 3. Evolution of user with strategy Sf , where f means using strategy Sf and n means using strategy Sn.
where the baseline fitness is normalized as 1. Similarly, for
a user with strategy Sn and k neighbors, among which kn
users adopting the same strategy Sn and k−kn users adopting
strategy Sf , his/her fitness can be written as
pin(k, kn) = (1− α) + α [knunn + (k − kn)ufn] . (8)
Table I summarizes the correspondence between the ter-
minologies in graphical EGT and those in the social network.
Based on the definitions of strategy and fitness, we can analyze
the stable information diffusion state in a social network
using graphical EGT. In the following two sections, we will
study two scenarios: information diffusion over uniform degree
network and non-uniform degree network, respectively.
III. INFORMATION DIFFUSION OVER UNIFORM DEGREE
NETWORK
In this section, we study the information diffusion process
over networks with uniform degree using graphical EGT. In
the uniform scenario, an N -user social network based on a
homogenous graph with general degree k is considered. When
there is new information originated from some user, other users
updates their forward strategies, i.e. either forward the infor-
mation or not (Sf or Sn). As for the users’ strategy update
rule, we model it using the aforementioned IM update rule.
Note that all the analysis in the section can be easily extended
to the BD and DB update rules. Let us define the network
user state as (pf , pn), which denotes the percentages of users
choosing strategies Sf and Sn among the whole population,
respectively. Our ultimate goal is to derive the evolutionary
stable network user state (p∗f , p∗n), which represents the final
diffusion status of the information.
In order to illustrate the network state evolving process
on a graph, the edge information of the graph is also
required. Let us further define the network edge state as
(pff , pfn, pnn), where pff and pnn represent the percentages
of edges on which both users choose same strategy Sf and
Sn, respectively; pfn represents the percentage of edges on
which one user chooses to forward the information while the
other chooses not. Moreover, let pf |n denote the percentage
of a user’s neighbors using strategy Sf , given the user is
using strategy Sn. Similarly, we have pf |f , pn|f and pn|n.
In such a case, according to the basic probability theory, we
can summarize the relationship of these defined variables as
follows:
pf + pn = 1, (9)
pf |f + pn|f = 1, pf |n + pn|n = 1, pfpn|f = pnpf |n, (10)
pff = pfpf |f , pfn = pfpn|f + pnpf |n, pnn = pnpn|n. (11)
Eqns. (9) and (11) imply that the state of the whole social
network can be described by only two variables, pf and pff .
In the following, we will first analyze the dynamics of pf and
pff . Based on the dynamics analysis, the evolutionary stable
network state can be achieved.
A. Evolution Dynamics of Network State
In order to derive the network ESS, we need to analyze
the evolution dynamics of the network state. As discussed
above, the network state can be represented by parameters pf
and pff , i.e., the network user state and network edge state.
In such a case, we will first derive the evolution dynamics
of pf and pff under the IM update rule, to understand the
information diffusion process over the social network. Then,
through analyzing the stable point of the network dynamics
p˙f and p˙ff , the final network ESS can be achieved.
According to the IM update rule, a user adopting strategy
Sf , i.e., forward the information, is selected for imitation with
probability pf . Fig. 3 illustrates a scenario where the center
user adopts strategy Sf , and among his/her k neighbors, there
are kf users adopting the same strategy Sf and k − kf users
adopting the opposite strategy Sn. The probability of such a
configuration is
θf (k, kf ) =
(
k
kf
)
p
kf
f |f
(
1− pf |f
)k−kf . (12)
According to the fitness definition in (7), the fitness of the
center user in the left part of Fig. 3, who adopts strategy Sf ,
can be calculated by
pif = (1− α) + α [kfuff + (k − kf )ufn] . (13)
Among the center user’s k neighbors, for the neighbors
adopting strategy Sf , each of them has (k− 1)pn|f neighbors
using strategy Sn and (k−1)pf |f+1 neighbors using strategy
Sf averagely, where “1” means the center user with strategy
Sf , as shown by the dashed lines in the left part of Fig. 3. In
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such a case, the average fitness of the center user’s neighbors
who adopt strategy Sf , i.e., forward the information, is
pif |f = (1−α)+α
(
(k− 1)pn|fufn+
[
(k− 1)pf |f +1
]
uff
)
.
(14)
Similarly, for the center user’s neighbors adopting strategy Sn,
each of them has (k−1)pn|n neighbors using strategy Sn and
(k−1)pf |n+1 neighbors using strategy Sf . Thus, the average
fitness of the center user’s neighbors who adopt strategy Sn,
i.e., not forward the information, is
pin|f = (1−α)+α
(
(k−1)pn|nunn+
[
(k−1)pf |n+1
]
ufn
)
.
(15)
According to the IM update rule, the probability of a user
updating his/her strategy is proportional to the fitness of the
corresponding strategy. In such a case, as shown in the middle
part of Fig. 3, the probability that the center user updates
his/her current strategy Sf by strategy Sn is
Pf→n(kf ) =
(k − kf )pin|f
kfpif |f + (k − kf )pin|f + pif
. (16)
Therefore, as shown in right part of Fig. 3, the center user
deviating from using strategy Sf leads to the percentage
of users adopting strategy Sf , pf , decreasing by 1/N with
probability
Prob
(
∆pf = −
1
N
)
=
k∑
kf=0
pfθf (k, kf )Pf→n(kf )
= pf
k∑
kf=0
(
k
kf
)
p
kf
f |f (1− pf |f)
k−kf
·
(k − kf )pin|f
kfpif |f + (k − kf )pin|f + pif
. (17)
Meanwhile, the center user deviating from using strategy Sf
also leads to the edges on which both users adopting strategy
Sf decreasing by kf , which means that pff decreases by 2kfkN
with probability
Prob
(
∆pff =
−2kf
kN
)
= pf
(
k
kf
)
p
kf
f |f(1− pf |f )
k−kf
·
(k − kf )pin|f
kfpif |f + (k − kf )pin|f + pif
.(18)
Similar analysis can be applied to the user adopting strategy
Sn. According to the IM update rule, a user adopting strategy
Sn is selected for imitation with probability pn = 1 − pf .
As shown in Fig. 4, among its k neighbors, suppose that there
are kn users adopting the same strategy Sn and k− kn users
adopting the opposite strategy Sf . The probability of such a
configuration is
θn(k, kn) =
(
k
kn
)
pknn|n(1− pn|n)
k−kn . (19)
Under such a configuration, the fitness of the center user who
adopts strategy Sn is
pin = (1 − α) + α [knunn + (k − kn)ufn] . (20)
Among his/her k neighbors, the average fitness of neighbors
who adopt strategy Sf is
pif |n = (1−α)+α
(
(k− 1)pf |fuff +
[
(k− 1)pn|f +1
]
ufn
)
,
(21)
and the fitness of node adopting strategy Sn is
pin|n = (1−α)+α
(
(k−1)pf |nufn+
[
(k−1)pn|n+1
]
unn
)
,
(22)
In such a case, as shown in the middle part of Fig. 4, the
probability that the center user updates his/her strategy Sn by
strategy Sf is
Pn→f (kn) =
(k − kn)pif |n
knpin|n + (k − kn)pif |n + pin
. (23)
Therefore, as shown in right part of Fig. 4, the center user
deviating from using strategy Sn leads to the percentage
of users adopting strategy Sf , pf , increasing by 1/N with
probability
Prob
(
∆pf =
1
N
)
=
k∑
kn=0
(1− pf )θn(k, kn)Pn→f (kn)
= (1− pf )
k∑
kn=0
(
k
kn
)
pknn|n(1− pn|n)
k−kn
·
(k − kn)pif |n
knpin|n + (k − kn)pif |n + pin
. (24)
Meanwhile, the deviation also leads to the edges on which
both users adopting strategy Sf increasing by k − kn, thus,
7we have
Prob
(
∆pff =
k − kn
kN/2
)
=(1 − pf )
(
k
kn
)
pknn|n(1− pn|n)
k−kn
·
(k − kn)pif |n
knpin|n + (k − kn)pif |n + pin
.(25)
Combining (17) and (24), we have the probabilities of pf
increasing 1/N and decreasing 1/N , respectively. In such a
case, we can calculate the expected variation of pf per unit
time, which is defined as the dynamic of pf , as
p˙f =
1
N
Prob
(
∆pf =
1
N
)
−
1
N
Prob
(
∆pf = −
1
N
)
=
αk(k − 1)pfn
2N(k + 1)2
(γ1unn + γ2ufn + γ3uff ) +O(α
2),
(26)
where the second equality is according to Taylor’s Theorem
and weak selection assumption with α goes to zero [36], and
the parameters γ1, γ2 and γ3 are given as follows:
γ1 = − pn|n[(k − 1)(pn|n + pf |f) + 3], (27)
γ2 = pn|n − pf |f + (pn|f − pf |n)
· [(k − 1)(pn|n + pf |f ) + 2], (28)
γ3 = pf |f [(k − 1)(pn|n + pf |f) + 3]. (29)
Under the weak selection, the payoff obtained from the in-
teractions is considered as limited contribution to the overall
fitness of each player. The results derived from weak selection
often remain as valid approximations for larger selection
strength [33]. Moreover, the weak selection has a long tradition
in theoretical biology [37]. Moreover, the weak selection
assumption can help achieve a close-form analysis of diffusion
process and better reveal how the strategy diffuses over the
network. From (26), we can see that the dynamics p˙f is an
increasing function in terms of uff , i.e., the payoff of both
users forwarding the released information. The corresponding
physical meaning is that when the higher payoff can be
obtained by forwarding the information, the increasing rate of
pf will also be higher. On the other hand, if not forwarding the
information can gain higher payoff, the increasing rate of pf
will be lower, which is just the reason why p˙f is a decreasing
function in terms of unn, i.e., the payoff of both users do
not forward the information. Similarly, by combining (18) and
(25), we have the probabilities of pff increasing 2kf/kN and
decreasing 2(k−kn)/kN , respectively. Thus, we can calculate
the expected variation of pff per unit time, which is defined
as the dynamic of pff , as
p˙ff =
k∑
kf=0
−2kf
kN
Prob
(
∆pff =
−2kf
kN
)
+
k∑
kn=0
2(k − kn)
kN
Prob
(
∆pff =
2(k − kn)
kN
)
=
pfn
(k + 1)N
(
1 + (k − 1)(pf |n − pf |f)
)
+O(α). (30)
B. ESS of Information Diffusion
As discussed in Section II-A, at the ESS, the network state
dynamics achieve stable point, i.e., p˙f = 0 and p˙ff = 0. By
setting p˙ff = 0, we have
pf |f − pf |n =
1
k − 1
. (31)
In such a case, according to (9)-(11) and (31), all the network
state parameters can be expressed only by pf as follow:
pf |f = pf +
1
k − 1
(1 − pf), (32)
pf |n =
k − 2
k − 1
pf , (33)
pn|f =
k − 2
k − 1
(1− pf ), (34)
pn|n = 1−
k − 2
k − 1
pf . (35)
Then, by substituting (32)-(35) and (27)-(29) into (26), we can
obtain the dynamic of the network user state, p˙f , as
p˙f =
αk(k − 2)(k + 3)
2N(k − 1)(k + 1)2
pf (1− pf )(apf − b), (36)
where the parameters a and b are given as follows:
a = (k − 2)(uff − 2ufn + unn), (37)
b = (k − 1)unn − (k − 2)ufn − uff . (38)
At the ESS, we have p˙f = 0. Therefore, there are three
evolutionary stable network states:
p∗f = 0, 1 and
b
a
. (39)
The following theorem shows the conditions of these stable
network states.
Theorem 1: In an N -user social network which can be
characterized by a graph with uniform degree k, if each user
updates his/her information forward strategy using the IM
update rule, the evolutionary stable network states can be
summarized as follows:
p∗f =


1, if uff > ufn > unn,
0, if unn > ufn > uff ,
(k−2)ufn+uff−(k−1)unn
2ufn−(k−2)(uff−unn)
, else.
(40)
Proof: Considering (26) and (30) as a nonlinear dynamic
system, we can examine whether the three stable points
are evolutionary stable network states through analyzing the
Jacobian matrix of the dynamics as follows:
J =
[
∂p˙f/∂pf ∂p˙f/∂pff
∂p˙ff/∂pf ∂p˙ff/∂pff
]
. (41)
The evolutionary stability requires that det(J) > 0 and
tr(J) < 0 [20]. By substituting (26) and (30) into (41), we can
obtain the three conditions for p∗f = 0, 1 and ba , respectively.
Due to page limitation, the detailed derivations are omitted
here.
Among these three ESSs, p∗f = 0 and 1 are two extreme sta-
ble states, representing no user forwarding the information and
all users forwarding the information, respectively. According
8to Theorem 1, we can see that the condition of p∗f = 1 means
that both users forwarding the information can gain the most
payoff, while not forwarding gains the least payoff. In a social
network, this is corresponding to the scenario where the re-
leased information is an extremely hot topic, forwarding which
can attract more attentions. On the contrary, the condition of
p∗f = 0 means that neither user forwarding the information
can gain the most payoff, while both forwarding gains the
least payoff, which is corresponding to the scenario where
the released information is useless or negative advertisement,
forwarding which can only incur unnecessary cost. For the
third ESS, p∗f = ba , some approximations can be made as
follows:
p∗f =
b
a
=
(k − 2)ufn + uff − (k − 1)unn
(k − 2)(2ufn − uff − unn)
=
(k − 1)(ufn − unn) + (uff − ufn)
(k − 2)(ufn − uff + ufn − unn)
=˙
1
1 +
ufn−uff
ufn−unn
, (42)
where the last approximation is based on the assumption that
the network degree k ≫ 2 in real social networks. In such a
case, we can further discuss some physical meanings of the
third ESS as follows.
• Case 1: ufn > uff and ufn > unn.
In this case, unilateral forwarding can bring more payoff
than no forwarding or both forwarding. In a social network,
this case is corresponding to the scenario where both users
forwarding the information can gain only limited reward but
incurring more cost to both of them. An example of this
case can be that the information is not the mainstream topic,
e.g. the news about a punk musician, and is supposed to be
diffused among people with similar interstates. Specifically,
when uff = unn, we have p∗f ≈ 0.5. This means that if
there is no payoff difference between forwarding and not
forwarding the information, the final stable network state tends
to “half and half”. Moreover, when ufn > uff > unn, we
have p∗f > 0.5, i.e., more than half of users’ strategies are
forwarding; while when ufn > unn > uff , we have p∗f < 0.5,
i.e., less than half of users’ forward the information.
• Case 2: uff > ufn and unn > ufn.
This is the opposite case of Case 1. In this case, the payoff
configuration is equivalent to that of the coordination game,
where both players with the same actions can make more
payoff than opposite actions. In a social network, this case
is corresponding to the scenario where both users forwarding
the information can enhance the popularity of them simultane-
ously with some forwarding costs. However, if only one user
forwards the information, the associated cost is larger than
the unilateral benefit. An example of this case can be that the
information is politically sensitive and the reality of it is not
guaranteed, forwarding which may gain attractions but also
incurring potential misleading cost.
IV. INFORMATION DIFFUSION OVER NON-UNIFORM
DEGREE NETWORK
In this section, we study the information diffusion process
over networks with non-uniform degree. In the non-uniform
scenario, we consider an N -user social network based on a
graph whose degree exhibits distribution λ(k). This distri-
bution means that when randomly choosing one user on the
network, the probability of the chosen user with k neighbors
is λ(k). In such a case, the average degree of the network is
k =
+∞∑
k=0
λ(k)k. (43)
Note that we do not take degree correlation into account, i.e.,
the degrees of all users are independent of each other. Similar
to the analysis in Section III, when some new information
is released, all users update their information forwarding
strategies in a spontaneous manner. In order to give more
insights on different evolutionary update rules, in this section,
we model the users’ information forwarding strategy update
using the aforementioned BD update rule. In the following,
we first analyze the general case of information diffusion over
non-uniform degree networks. Then, we focus on two special
cases, i.e., two typical random networks, Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random
network and Baraba´si-Albert scale-free networks.
A. General Case
In the analysis of non-uniform degree network, to ensure
the derivation of ESS is mathematically realizable, we assume
that the network user state pf and the network edge states
pff , pfn and pnn, do not depend on the degree. With such an
assumption, eqns. (9) and (11) still hold for the non-uniform
degree network, i.e., the network state can still be described
by two variables pf and pff . As a matter of fact, it has been
shown that the dependence of the network state on degree is
weak [38]. Similar to the analysis in Section III, in order to
find the evolutionary stable network state, we need to first
derive the evolving dynamics of pf and pff .
According to the BD update rule, a user is chosen with
the probability being proportional to fitness. Then, the chosen
user’s strategy replaces one of his/her neighbors’ strategies
uniformly. As shown in Fig. 3, suppose the chosen user is
adopting strategy Sf and with degree l. Among his/her neigh-
bors, there are lf users adopting the same strategy Sf and
l− lf users adopting the opposite strategy Sn. In such a case,
the probability that the chosen user’s strategy Sf replaces one
of his/her neighbors adopting strategy Sn is
Pn→f (l, lf) = pfθf (l, lf)
pif (l, lf)
pi
l − lf
l
, (44)
where θf (l, lf ) is the probability of the configuration given in
(12), pif (l, lf ) is the fitness of the chosen user given in (7) and
pi is the expected fitness of all users which can be calculated
9as follows:
pi = Npf
+∞∑
k=0
λ(k)
(
kpf |fuff + k(1− pf |f)ufn
)
+
Npn
+∞∑
k=0
λ(k)
(
kpn|nunn + k(1− pn|n)ufn
)
= N(pffuff + pfnufn + pnnunn). (45)
Therefore, the percentage of users adopting strategy Sf , pf ,
increases by 1/N with expected probability
Prob
(
∆pf =
1
N
)
=
+∞∑
l=0
λ(l)
l∑
lf=0
pfθf (l, lf)
pif (l, lf)
pi
l− lf
l
.
(46)
Suppose the replaced user, who was adopting strategy Sn, is
with degree l′. After strategy update, the edges on which both
users adopting strategy Sf will increase by (l′ − 1)pf |n + 1.
In such a case, we have
Prob
(
∆pff =
(l′ − 1)pf |n + 1
kN/2
)
= Prob
(
∆pf =
1
N
)
, (47)
where k is the average degree of the network given in (43).
Similarly, suppose the chosen user is adopting strategy
Sn and with degree m as shown in Fig. 3. Among his/her
neighbors, there are mn users adopting the same strategy Sf
and m−mn users adopting the opposite strategy Sn. In such a
case, according to the BD update rule, the percentage of users
adopting strategy Sf , pf , decreases by 1/N with expected
probability
Prob
(
∆pf = −
1
N
)
=
+∞∑
m=0
λ(m)
m∑
mf=0
(1− pf )θn(m,mf )
pin(m,mf )
pi
mf
m
, (48)
where θn(k, kf ) is given in (19), pin(k, kf ) is given in (8)
and pi is given in (45). Suppose the replaced user, who was
adopting strategy Sf , is with degree m′. After strategy update,
the edges on which both users adopting strategy Sf will
decrease by (m′ − 1)pf |f . In such a case, we have
Prob
(
∆pff = −
(m′ − 1)pf |f
kN/2
)
= Prob
(
∆pf = −
1
N
)
.(49)
Combining (46) and (48), we have the dynamics of pf as
p˙f =
1
N
Prob
(
∆pf =
1
N
)
−
1
N
Prob
(
∆pf = −
1
N
)
=
α(k − 1)pfn
2piN
[
pf |f (uff − ufn)− pn|n(unn − ufn)
]
+O(α2),
(50)
where k is the average degree of the network given in (43).
Combining (47) and (49), we have the dynamics of pff as
p˙ff =
(l′ − 1)pf |n + 1
kN/2
· Prob
(
∆pf =
1
N
)
−
(m′ − 1)pf |f
kN/2
· Prob
(
∆pf = −
1
N
)
, (51)
where l′ and m′ are the average degrees of the replaced users
during the strategy update, which are different with the average
degree of the whole network, k. If a link is selected at random,
the degree distribution of the node on the specific link is not
λ(k) but rather kλ(k)∑+∞
k=0
kλ(k)
[39]. Thus, the average degree of
the replaced users is
l′ = m′ =
+∞∑
k=0
k
kλ(k)∑+∞
k=0 kλ(k)
=
k2
k
, (52)
where k2 =
∑+∞
k=0 k
2λ(k) is the expectoration of k2. Based
on the dynamics of pf and pff in (50) and (51), we can obtain
the following theorem.
Theorem 2: In an N -user social network which can be
characterized by a graph with degree distribution λ(k), if each
user updates his/her information forward strategy using the
BD update rule, the evolutionary stable network states can be
summarized as follows:
p∗f =


1, if uff > ufn > unn,
0, if unn > ufn > uff ,
(k2/k−2)(ufn−unn)+(uff−unn)
(k2/k−2)(2ufn−uff−unn)
, else.
(53)
Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, the evolutionary
stable network state p∗f can be derived by solving p˙f = 0 and
p˙ff = 0 in (51) and (52). Meanwhile, the conditions in (53)
can be obtained by analyzing the Jacob matrix of p˙f and p˙ff .
Due to page limitation, the detailed derivation is omitted.
B. Special Cases
In this subsection, we discuss two special cases of the non-
uniform degree networks, Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random network [40]
and Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network [41]. For the Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi random (ER) network, the degree follows a Poisson
distribution, i.e.,
λER(k) =
e−kk
k
k!
and k2 = k(k + 1). (54)
In such a case, according to Theorem 2, the ESS of Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi random network is
p∗fER =


1, if uff > ufn > unn,
0, if unn > ufn > uff ,
(k−1)(ufn−unn)+(uff−unn)
(k−1)(2ufn−uff−unn)
, else.
(55)
For the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free (BA) network, the degree
follows a power law distribution, i.e.,
λBA(k) ∝ k
−ξ and k2=˙k2 logN/4 (when ξ = 3). (56)
In such a case, according to Theorem 2, the ESS of Baraba´si-
Albert scale-free network is
p∗fBA =


1, if uff > ufn > unn,
0, if unn > ufn > uff ,
(k logN−8)(ufn−unn)+4(uff−unn)
(k logN−8)(2ufn−uff−unn)
, else.
(57)
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V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we conduct experiments to verify the infor-
mation diffusion analysis. First, we simulate the information
diffusion process on synthetic networks. Then, we conduct
information diffusion experiment on real-world networks, i.e.,
the Facebook social network. Finally, we use real-world infor-
mation diffusion dataset to further verify the diffusion analysis.
A. Synthetic Networks
In the experiment of synthetic networks, we generate three
kinds of networks to simulate the information diffusion pro-
cess:
• the uniform-degree network;
• the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random network;
• the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network.
For each network, we generate 1000 users and initialize each
user with random strategy: Sf or Sn. In the simulations, four
kinds of payoff matrices are considered as follows:
• PM 1: uff > ufn > unn
Sf Sn
Sf
(
0.8 0.6
)
Sn 0.6 0.4
(58)
• PM 2: ufn > uff > unn
Sf Sn
Sf
(
0.6 0.8
)
Sn 0.8 0.4
(59)
• PM 3: ufn > unn > uff
Sf Sn
Sf
(
0.4 0.8
)
Sn 0.8 0.6
(60)
• PM 4: unn > ufn > uff
Sf Sn
Sf
(
0.4 0.6
)
Sn 0.6 0.8
(61)
Fig. 5 shows the experiment results for the uniform-degree
network under different average degrees and payoff matrices.
The theoretical results is calculated from (40) directly, while
the simulation results are obtained by simulating the IM
strategy update rule over the generated network. For each
simulation run, the strategy update steps are repeated until
the network reaches the stable network state. Meanwhile, the
network structure is re-generated every 500 runs to prevent any
spurious results based on one particular realization of a specific
network type. From Fig. 5, we can see that all the simulation
results are consistent with the theoretical results, which verifies
the correctness of our diffusion analysis and the conclusion in
Theorem 1. Moreover, different settings of the payoff matrix
can lead to different evolutionary stable network states, while
the network degree variations have little influence on the stable
network states. Such a structure-free phenomenon is consistent
with our approximation analysis for the large-degree case after
Theorem 1, especially in (42).
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Fig. 5. Simulation results for the uniform-degree network.
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Fig. 6. Simulation results for the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random network.
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Fig. 7. Simulation results for the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network.
Fig. 6 and 7 show the experiment results for the non-uniform
degree networks under different average degrees and payoff
matrices, including the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random network and the
Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network. The theoretical results are
calculated from (55) and (57) directly, while the simulation
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Fig. 8. Graph structure of the Facebook network used for experiment.
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Fig. 9. Degree characteristics of the Facebook network.
results are obtained by simulating the BD strategy update rule
over the two generated networks. We can see that the all the
simulation results agree well with the theoretical results. In
Fig. 7, the small gap for the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free net-
works is due to the fact that there is weak dependence between
the network state and the network degree, while we neglected
such dependence in the diffusion analysis. Nevertheless, we
can see that the gap is relatively small and indeed negligible.
B. Real-World Networks
In the experiment of real-world network, we evaluate the
information diffusion process over Facebook social network
[42]. The Facebook dataset contains totally 4039 users and
88234 edges, where the edge means the connection between
two users [4]. The abstract graph of the Facebook network is
depicted in Fig. 8, where the nodes with large degrees, i.e.,
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Fig. 10. Experiment result for the Facebook network.
the users with large number of friends, are highlighted. Mean-
while, we also plot the degree characteristics of the Facebook
network in Fig. 9, including the cumulative distribution (CDF)
and probability density (PDF) of the network users’ degrees.
From the CDF, we can see that the users’ degrees vary from
1 to 300 and 90 percents of the users are with less than 100
degrees. From the PDF where the axes are in logarithm scale,
we can see that the Facebook network degree exhibits the
scale-free phenomenon [41].
The Facebook dataset contains ten ego-networks, which
means that there are ten subgraphs. In the experiment, we
simulate the information diffusion process over the ten sub-
graphs respectively. Fig. 10 shows the experiment results under
different payoff matrix settings. The theoretical results are cal-
culated from (53), while the simulation results are obtained by
simulating the BD strategy update rule over the ten subgraphs.
It can be seen that the simulation results match well with
the theoretical results for all ten subgraphs. The small gaps
for some figures, e.g., the 10-th subgraph, are mainly due to
the neglected dependence between the network state and the
network degree. Since the average degrees of all subgraphs
are similar with each other, the evolutionary network stable
states of all subgraphs are also similar with each other.
C. Information Diffusion Dataset Evaluation
In this subsection, we further verify our diffusion analysis
using real-world information spreading dataset [21]. In the
previous two subsections, we first set the users’ payoff matrix,
and then conducted experiments to find the final stable state.
In this experiment, an inverse step is conducted, we first
estimate the evolutionary stable state through mining the
real-world information spreading dataset, and then train the
corresponding payoff matrix. The dataset used for experiment,
named “MemeTracker”, contains more than 172 million news
articles and blog posts from 1 million online sources [43].
When a site publishes a new post, it will put hyperlinks
to related posts in some other sites published earlier as its
sources. And later, the site will also be cited by other newer
posts as well. In such a case, the hyperlinks between articles
12
2  8  we're not commenting on that story i'm afraid   2131865
3  3  we're not commenting on that    489007
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Fig. 11. Example of the Memetracker phrase cluster dataset [21].
TABLE II
EXPERIMENT RESULTS FOR MEMETRACKER DATASET.
Group Index 1 2 3 4 5
ESS 0.19 0.35 0.53 0.77 0.81
and posts can be used to represent the spreading of information
from one site to another site.
In the MemeTracker phrase cluster dataset, each “phrase
cluster” contains all the plain and mutant phrases in one
cluster, a list of sites where the phrases appeared, and time
indexes when the phrase appeared. An example of one phrase
cluster in the dataset is shown in Fig. 11. In such a case, each
phrase cluster can be regarded as a diffusion process of one
piece of information. We extract 5 group of sites, where each
group includes 500 sites. Each group is regarded as a complete
graph and each site is considered as a user in our information
diffusion game. We divide the dataset into two halfs, where the
first half is used to train the payoff matrix and the second half
is used for testing. Through calculating the average hyperlinks
of all phrases clusters in each group, we can obtain the
statistical evolutionary stable state of each group using the first
half dataset, as shown in Table II. We can see that the sites in
group 5 share major common interests, while the sites in group
1 share relatively rare common interests. Using our proposed
game theoretic analysis and the data-mining based approach,
enterprises/polititians can classify users into different same-
interest categories according to the stable states of different
information diffusions, which can help them to achieve more
effective advertisement/advocation.
Since the site network of each group is considered as a
uniform degree network, by taking Table II back to Theorem
1 and normalize ufn as 1, we can find the relationship between
uff and unn. Based on the relationship, we can parameterize
the payoff matrix of each group, simulate their information
diffusion processes on uniform degree graph and achieve the
simulated stable information diffusion state of each group.
Meanwhile, we can also test the stable information diffusion
state of each group using the second half of the Memetracker
dataset. Fig. 12 shows the simulated results from our game
theoretical analysis and the estimated results from the real-
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Fig. 12. Experiment result for Memetracker dataset.
world dataset, from which we can see they match well with
each other. We also depict the variances of the estimated
results in Fig. 12, which shows that the simulated results are
always in the variance interval of the corresponding estimated
results. This further verifies that our graphical evolutionary
game theoretical analysis for the information diffusion over
social network is effective and practical.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we formulate the information diffusion prob-
lem using graphical evolutionary game theory. We defined
the players, strategies and payoff matrix in this problem,
and highlight the correspondence between graphical EGT and
information diffusion. Two kinds of networks, uniform and
non-uniform degree social networks, are analyzed with the
derivation of closed-form expressions of the stable network
diffusion states. Moreover, we analyzed the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi ran-
dom network and the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network. To
validate our theoretical analysis, we conducted experiments
on synthetic networks, real-world Facebook networks, as well
we real-world information diffusion dataset of Twitter and
Memetracker. All the experiment results were consistent with
corresponding theoretical results, which corroborated that our
proposed graphical EGT framework is effective and practical
for modeling the information diffusion problem.
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